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A
t one time, risk management meant
buying corporate insurance, imple-
menting procedures to avoid lawsuits
and accidents, and installing safety equip-
ment. The new risk management uses
ﬁnancial markets to hedge different
sources of risk within the ﬁrm. Trading 
in ﬁnancial markets can hedge companies
against the risk of changes in interest rates,
input prices, or currency ﬂuctuations.
While hedging per se is not new, the scale
and diversity of hedging are far greater
than they used to be. When executed
properly, the new risk management can 
be good and even essential for competi-
tion. Unfortunately, the new risk manage-
ment can also be bad, wasting resources
without reducing risk and perhaps even
increasing it. The new risk management
can be ugly, generating large losses such 
as those in widely publicized cases at
Barings, Metallgesellschaft, Procter and
Gamble, and other ﬁrms. In these and
many other ﬁrms, employees relatively 
far from the top of the hierarchy of control
had the authority to take ﬁnancial posi-
tions large enough to generate losses that
could bankrupt the ﬁrm. Thus, policies for
risk management should be put in place at
the highest level of a ﬁrm, and they should
provide for monitoring and control. The
purpose of this article is to provide an
introduction to the new risk management
and some policy choices ﬁrms should 
be considering.
We start with a discussion of the
option-pricing tools that make the new
risk management possible, and we follow
with a stylized example of how the new
risk management ought to work. Then we
consider implementation issues, including
some general policy questions as well as
some accounting issues. 
TOOLS FOR THE NEW RISK
MANAGEMENT
Starting with the famous work of Black
and Scholes (see shaded insert, next page),
option-pricing theory has been very
successful in pricing various ﬁnancial
claims. The Black-Scholes model was
designed to price standard call and put
options, and it has been extended to price
all sorts of ﬁnancial claims. The Black-
Scholes model and its extensions form 
the theoretical foundation for the new 
risk management.
There were option-pricing models
prior to the work of Black and Scholes,
including some models with formulas 
similar to Black-Scholes. What makes the
Black-Scholes model different is that it
provides a hedging strategy that is an
investment policy with an investment
equal to the model’s option price and a 
terminal value equal to the terminal 
value of the option. Knowing the trading
strategy means that the model is not only
someone’s best guess; it is also possible 
to proﬁt if the model is wrong. If the
model price is lower than the price in the
economy, we can sell the option, pocket
the excess over the model price, and invest
in the hedging strategy to cover the
terminal value of the option we have sold.
If the model price is higher than the price
in the economy, we follow the hedging
strategy in reverse, taking a short position
instead of a long position and lending
instead of borrowing. In the model, the
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Weidenbaum.hedge replicates the option value perfectly;
in practice, the hedge is not perfect, but it
works remarkably well. This is why the
Black-Scholes model and its progeny are
widely used in business. 
The introduction of these option-
pricing models and the parallel
development and maturation of liquid
ﬁnancial markets have made it easier 
and easier to hedge ﬁnancial risks using
options, futures, futures options, swaps,
caps, collars, ﬂoors, and a variety of 
other ﬁnancial instruments. 
OPTION PRICING AND  
RISK MANAGEMENT
Hedging an option is an example of
risk management.  Its purpose is to remove
the risk and capture the pure economic
proﬁt of the transaction. Fundamentally,
this strategy is the same as insurance. For
the insured, the insurance policy makes
money in bad times (when the insurable
event occurs) and loses money in good
times (when no insurable event occurs but
the premium is paid), which reduces risk
by softening the impact of bad outcomes.
The same is true of a hedging strategy;
losing money on the hedge in good times
and making money in bad times offsets the
original cash ﬂows, making the total cash
ﬂow less volatile. In either strategy,
payment for the insurance can be “up-
front” or “pay-as-you-go”: For hedging, as
for insurance, the arrangement of cash
ﬂows1 accommodates the preference of the
insured. There are important differences in
taxation and regulation between hedging
using insurance and hedging using ﬁnan-
cial markets, but those are beyond the
scope of this paper. 
1 Cash-ﬂow is the accounting
notion of actual cash coming in
or out from operations. Unlike
proﬁts, cash ﬂow does not
include depreciation or amorti-
zation, but it does include (as
an offset) investment in capi-
tal. In our examples later, we
will treat the two the same,
although this is not appropriate
except in the case of very sim-
ple businesses that rent any
required capital.  
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THE BLACK-SCHOLES OPTION-PRICING MODEL
The precursor of all modern option-pricing models was developed by Fischer
Black and Myron Scholes.
† The main result is an option-pricing formula based on
simple and reasonable assumptions in a continuous-time model. The remarkable
thing about the result is that it relies on the absence of arbitrage, and part of the proof
is a formula that speciﬁes a trading strategy in the underlying stock and the riskless
bond that will replicate the payoff of the option at the end.
†† If the option is priced
differently in the economy, buying or selling the option and following either the trad-
ing strategy or the reverse of the trading strategy will make money!  Using the same
sort of analysis, one can derive a trading strategy that will hedge the ﬁnancial risk in a
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows.
Now we present the Black-Scholes formula for the price of a call option.  Recall
that a call option gives the owner the right (at the owner’s option) but not the obliga-
tion to buy one share of the underlying stock at the strike (or exercise) price X speci-
ﬁed in the option contract on or before the maturity date of the option.  If the stock
price is S and the price of the bond promising to pay the amount of the strike price at
the maturity date of the option is B, the Black-Scholes price, C, of the call option is
C = S N(x1) – B N(x2),
where
x1 = log (S/B)/s + s/2,
x2 = log (S/B)/s – s/2, and
s is the standard deviation (or square root of the variance) of the stock price at 
maturity, given the stock price today, and the function N () is the cumulative normal Using dynamic trading strategies to
hedge ﬁnancial options may seem signiﬁ-
cantly different from hedging price risk in
a ﬁrm. However, the concept is exactly the
same. A hedger is taking the other side of
the risky investment in futures or
whatever would be used to replicate the
cash ﬂows that are being hedged.
Normally, these cash ﬂows cannot be
hedged precisely, but the hedge can still
reduce risk signiﬁcantly. For example, one
policy is to hedge the expected cash ﬂow
conditional on the price of inputs that can
be hedged in futures markets while leaving
the remainder unhedged, which means
that the remaining risk is borne by the
stock and bond holders of the ﬁrm.
Before turning to the general policy
issues in risk management, we will
consider a typical example. 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN
MANUFACTURING
Our example considers the hedging
problem of a manufacturer that uses signif-
icant amounts of copper as an input.
(With little change in the discussion, this
input could be zinc, silver, oil, or wheat.
With a slightly greater change, the
“production” could be servicing of core
deposits in a bank, and the analysis would
provide the optimal hedging of interest
rates.) We will examine the optimal
hedging of copper price movements in the
cash ﬂows before turning to a general dis-
cussion of policy and oversight. 
In the example, expected output is
1,000 units, which will sell for $100 per
unit. The price has been committed to in
advance because of long-term contracts,
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distribution function.  If there is a constant, continuously-compounded interest rate,
r, and T is the time-to-maturity of the option, then B is the discounted exercise price
B = Xexp(–rT).
And, if the stock has a variance, v, per unit time, we have that
s2 = vT
is the variance of the ﬁnal stock price.
In the expression for C, the ﬁrst term is the stock holding in the hedge strategy,
and the second term is the bond holding (which is negative, which is a short sale or
borrowing).  The main assumptions of the model are absence of arbitrage, a constant
riskless rate, continuous stock prices, and a constant variance of returns per unit of
time for the underlying stock.  The intuition is that we can replicate the risk of hold-
ing the option by holding just the right portfolio of riskless bonds and the underlying
stock. For example, if at a point in time the option moves ﬁfty cents for each one-dol-
lar movement in the underlying stock price, then the replicating strategy would hold
one share of stock for each two options we are replicating.  To hedge the value of the
option, we would short (borrow) a share of stock for each of two options.  In that
case, the stock’s value change would neutralize the effect on our wealth of the
option’s price change.  The hedge’s holdings in the stock and bond will change over
time and in response to stock price changes, since the sensitivity of the option value
is different when the option is in the money than when it is out.
† Black, F. and M. Scholes, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities” Journal of Political Economy 81, 1973, 637-54.
†† For more discussion of why this makes sense, see Rubinstein, M. and H. Leland, “Replicating Options with Positions in Stock and Cash,”
Financial Analysts Journal, (Jan-Feb 1995), pp. 113-21.but the quantity may vary around this
expectation because the contracts give cus-
tomers the option to choose how much to
buy within a range. Each unit will use an
amount of copper that would cost $20
purchased forward (in a ﬁrm commitment
to buy one year from now). If purchased in
the spot market, the copper in the unit
might cost $25 (with probability 1/4), 
$20 (with probability 1/2), or $15 (with
probability 1/4).
One obvious (and common) approach
to hedging in this context would be to
forecast demand for copper and then hedge
that amount, either by entering a ﬁxed-
price contract with the supplier or by
buying that amount of copper futures—
at a shorter maturity, if necessary, because
one-year futures are not traded or have a
very large spread. This might be a natural
outcome if hedging were performed by
buyers who were responsible for copper
procurement and whose evaluations were
based on the cost of a forecast quantity of
copper. However, choosing a useful hedge
of the entire cash ﬂow is more subtle 
than that.
Table 1 contains an elaboration of the
example. When the economy is doing
well, copper prices are high (since this
ﬁrm and other manufacturers are
demanding more copper) and so is
demand for the ﬁrm’s output. Table 1A
shows the cash ﬂows in the absence of any
special risk management to hedge copper
price risk. Table 1B shows the result of
hedging by buying forward the expected
quantity. Ironically, this naive approach to
hedging increases risk exposure, since the
ﬁrm is already more than hedged by
increased sales when the industry is doing
well and copper prices rise. The full hedge,
A Manufacturer’s Copper Price Hedge
Each section of this table shows the cash ﬂows one year from now for the simple example of a manufacturer that is facing copper price
risk. In the example, copper prices are higher when demand for output is higher. Each section of the table illustrates a different hedging
strategy and proﬁt (= cash ﬂow) in three copper price scenarios. The example abstracts from taxes and sources of risk that are not related
to the price of copper. In each case, the expected proﬁt is 1,500. The point of hedging is reducing uncertainty, not increasing average cash
ﬂow (except indirectly, because it allows you more freedom in choosing projects).
Unhedged Cash Flows
Copper Units  Output Total Copper Other Proﬁt 
Probability  Price  Sold  Price  Sales  Expense  Expenses  (Loss)
1/4  25  1,200  100  120,000  30,000  82,000  8,000
1/2  20  1,000  100  100,000  20,000  78,000  2,000
1/4  15  800  100  80,000  12,000  74,000  (6,000)
Naive Hedge of the Expected
Quantity Required  
This hedge might be put in place as part of the procurement
process, since it looks only at expenses. This is at best an
incomplete hedge of copper costs, since the true quantity
changes with copper prices. In our example, this naive hedge
actually increases risk, since increased sales mean proﬁts are
high when copper prices are high.
Probability Unhedged Hedge Net
1/4  8,000  5,000  13,000
1/2  2,000  0  2,000
1/4  (6,000)  (5,000)  (11,000)
Fully Hedged Cash Flows  
A complete hedge of all the cash ﬂows requires something
more than a simple purchase of futures, since the sensitivity 
to copper prices of the unhedged proﬁt or loss is higher when
copper prices are low than when copper prices are high. 
Probability Unhedged Hedge Net
1/4  8,000  (6,500)  1,500
1/2  2,000  (500)  1,500
1/4  (6,000)  7,500  1,500
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Table 1Cthe result of which is shown in Table 1C,
cannot be implemented by simply buying or
selling copper forward one year. However,
the full hedge can be implemented either by
buying options or by dynamic  trading in
forward or futures contracts. Since this
type of strategy is typical of hedging prob-
lems, it is worthwhile deriving the dynamic
hedge and discussing its operation.
THE DYNAMIC HEDGE
To study the dynamic hedge, we need
to understand the trading opportunities
and information between now and realiza-
tion of the cash ﬂows a year from now. The
sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s value to copper
prices varies in response to the interim
information, and this changing sensitivity
should be reﬂected in our trades.
In the current example, we assume
that the ﬁrm is using copper futures
contracts to hedge changes in copper
prices. Futures serve the same economic
purpose as forward purchases, but they 
are somewhat different logistically, since
for futures the money changes hands
immediately when the prospective value 
of copper rises and falls. If we buy one
futures contract, then at the end of each
day we are given (more literally, our
margin account is credited with) the
change in futures price over the day. If 
we sell (or short) one futures contract,
then we must pay the change. If the
futures price increases from $50 to $55,
then the owner of two futures contracts
will collect $10, and someone who has
sold two futures contracts will have to 
pay $10. If the futures price instead
decreases from $50 to $45, the person
short two contracts collects $10, and the
person long two contracts has to pay $10.
In general, the futures price need not be
exactly equal to the price we would pay 
for forward purchase, but for most
purposes we can think of the two as 
being the same.2
In the actual economy, information
arrives minute-by-minute, and a ﬁrm can
trade on copper prices almost continuously
in time. For our simple example, informa-
tion arrival and trading occur now, six
months in, and again in a year. (This is not
an essential simpliﬁcation; while the
analysis for a practical model requires
more computations, it is conceptually no
more difﬁcult.) At the beginning of the
year, the futures price of copper delivered
a year from now is $20. Six months from
now, the futures price will be either
$22.50, with probability 1/2, or $17.50,
also with probability 1/2. The overall price
dynamic is given in Figure 1. The price at
a node in the tree is the price paid in a
ﬁrm commitment to buy copper one year
from now. From a given node, an up or
down move is equally likely, with probability
1/2, so any given price path has probability
1/4 = 1/2 3  1/2. Consistent with Table 1,
the ending node of $20 is twice as likely as
the other ending nodes because it can be
reached by either an up move followed by
a down move (probability 1/4) or a down
move followed by an up move (probability
1/4). A ﬁnal price of $25 comes only from
two up moves (probability 1/4), and a ﬁnal
price of $15 comes only from two down
moves (probability 1/4).
To derive the full dynamic hedge, 
the ﬁrm requires one more piece of infor-
mation, which is the rate at which futures
gains or losses will be reinvested, which
we will take to be 5 percent simple interest
over six months. (Actually, the rate we
choose will not affect the hedged cash
ﬂows in Table 1C, since increasing this
rate will result in a completely offsetting
decrease in the number of contracts we
hold over the ﬁrst six months.) Holding
one futures contract at one node implies 
a gain of $2.50 (given an up move) or a
loss of $2.50 (given a down move), which
2 In fact, if interest rates are non-
random (so re-investment rates
are known in advance),
absence of arbitrage implies
that the forward price must
equal the futures price,
although one futures contract
has more impact, since the
change in value is received up
front, while in a forward con-
tract the change in value occurs
at maturity.
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Figure 1
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A SMALL GLOSSARY OF RISK-MANAGEMENT TERMS
Binomial model. The binomial option-pricing model, developed by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [1979],
assumes that the stock return over a short time interval has one of two values. The binomial
model is a popular alternative to the Black-Scholes model because it is ﬂexible and easy to
implement on a computer. 
Black-Scholes model. This is the original modern option-pricing model (see shaded insert on pp. 10-11).
Call option. A call option is a contract that gives the owner the right to purchase a share of the under-
lying asset in exchange for the contractually speciﬁed strike price (or exercise price). An
American call option can be exercised at any time before maturity, while a European call option
can be exercised only on the maturity date. 
Cap. An interest-rate cap is a promise to pay the excess of an interest rate above some level in each of
a number of periods. Caps are useful for containing the risk of rising borrowing costs. 
Collar. A collar combines the cash ﬂows of buying a cap and selling a ﬂoor. It is useful for containing
the risk of rising interest rates (like a cap); including the ﬂoor gives up some proﬁt potential
when rates fall to help to pay for the cap. 
Floor. An interest-rate ﬂoor is a promise to pay the shortfall of an interest rate below some level in
each of a number of periods. Floors are useful for locking in a minimum return. 
Forward contract. A forward contract gives the owner the right and the obligation to buy a speciﬁed
amount of a commodity at a speciﬁed price at some speciﬁed date in the future. 
Futures contract. A futures contract is similar to a forward contract except that there is daily settle-
ment, i.e., each day the parties to the contract exchange money representing the market-deter-
mined change in value of the contract. Daily settlement minimizes the need for credit checks
and large margin accounts (which are held as collateral), since only one day’s price variation 
is at risk. 
Hedge. Hedging a position (or entering a hedge) is undertaking another activity with offsetting risk.
Some common hedging instruments include insurance, futures contracts, and options. 
Long position. To take a long position (or to “be long”) is to purchase an asset or futures. 
Put option. A put option is a contract that gives the owner the right to sell a share of the underlying
asset in exchange for the contractually speciﬁed strike price (or exercise price). An American put
option can be exercised at any time before maturity, while a European put option can be exercised
only on the maturity date. 
Short position. To take a short position (or to “sell short”) is to assume the opposite of a long position.
In the case of futures, they are simply sold in the market. Shares and other securities are bor-
rowed (for a nominal fee) then sold in the market, with the promise of buying some shares later
to return the borrowed shares. In the meantime, the short must pay any dividends or coupons
that are due the person from whom the shares were borrowed. The cash ﬂows for a short posi-
tion are the negative of the cash ﬂows for a long position. 
Value at risk. Value at risk (VAR) is a measure and methodology for assessing risk exposure by look-
ing at total exposure to various market-level risks. This is a useful tool, but it does not account
for residual risk that is speciﬁc to the project and not related to the market-level risks.is reinvested until the end at the interest 
rate. From this we can use simple algebra
to derive the solution. In the example, 
the full hedge is implemented by the
following strategy: At the start, the ﬁrm
sells 1400/1.05 ~ 1,333 futures at the
futures price of $20. If futures go down 
to $17.50, the ﬁrm increases the short
position to 1,600 contracts, while if
futures go up to $22.50, the ﬁrm reduces
the short position to 1,200 contracts. 
The terminal cash ﬂow generated by
the hedge (including reinvestment) is ana-
lyzed in Table 2. For example, the second
row shows the effects of the hedge when
prices go up and then down (from $20 to
$22.50 and back to $20). The hedge starts
with no initial cash. It shorts 1,333
contracts, and when in six months the
futures price goes up by $2.50, $2.503
1,333 = $3,333 is borrowed, and the short
futures position is reduced to 1,200
contracts. When the futures price falls by
$2.50, $2.5 3  1,200 = $3,000 in proﬁts are
collected, and after payment of $3,333 3
1.05 = $3,500 on the loan, net cash from
the hedge is $3,000 – $3,500 for a loss of
$500. Added to the unhedged cash ﬂow 
in that state of $2,000 (from Table 1A), 
the hedged cash ﬂow is $1,500. The 
calculations in the other states work 
the same way. 
We can see now that the dynamic
hedge was chosen so that the re-invested
proceeds of the hedge plus the original
cash ﬂows are made to be the same in
every contingency. The necessary hedge
can be computed by working backward
from the end. The ﬁrst two rows differ
only in the price performance over the 
last period. Since the difference in pre-
hedge cash ﬂow for these two scenarios 
is $8,000 – $2,000 = $6,000 and the differ-
ence in futures prices for the two scenarios
is $25 – $20, we require $6,000 / $5 = 1,200
contracts to replicate the cash ﬂows or
short 1,200 contracts (the offsetting posi-
tion) to hedge the cash ﬂows. Given the
calculated hedge at the last date, the calcu-
lation at the next earlier date proceeds 
in the same way, and so forth back to 
the start. The entire strategy can be
computed by looking at the linear equations
implicit in Table 2, or by standard
techniques described in option pricing
textbooks. 
While the model underlying the 
hedge for the simple example probably
seems too simple, it is in fact similar
(except for the number of intermediate
trading dates) to the binomial models 
used successfully in practice. Adding 
the additional subperiods is straight-




In the example in the previous
sections, we assumed that hedging is desir-
able. However, this assumption is far from
obvious, and it is useful to examine poten-
tial motives for hedging. 
Why Should We Hedge?
The reason for hedging should link
back to the overall objective of the ﬁrm,
which is to create or enhance economic
value. There is a general issue of whether
the ﬁrm should maximize narrowly the
value to shareholders, the total value to all
ﬁnancial claimants, or some more general
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1997
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
15
Cash Flows from the Dynamic Hedge  
Futures Cash # Contract Cash in  # Contracts Cash in Pre-hedge  Hedged
Price Path  Now  Now  6 months  in 6 months  1 yr  Cash Flow  Cash Flow
20-22.50-25  0  (1,333)  (3,333)  (1,200)  (6,500)  8,000  1,500
20-22.50-20  0  (1,333)  (3,333)  (1,200)  (500)  2,000  1,500
20-17.50-20  0  (1,333)  3,333  (1,600)  (500)  2,000  1,500
20-17.50-15  0 (1,33 3)  3,333  (1,600)  7,500  (6,000)  1,500
Table 2social value to a variety of stakeholders.
This distinction will not be so important to
us; most importantly, we will assume that
taxes (governments’ claims) are not part of
what we are optimizing, and for concrete-
ness we will speak of maximizing value to
shareholders in the ﬁrm. 
The ﬁrst and most obvious effect of
hedging is that it reduces the volatility of
the value received by shareholders. Unfor-
tunately, this does not have any value for
most shareholders in a large publicly-
traded ﬁrm, who hold the shares in a
well-diversiﬁed portfolio and for whom
the additional risk is unimportant. Indeed,
a conﬂict of interest may exist between the
majority of shareholders and large
shareholders (for example, members of the
founding family who hold 30 percent of
the shares and where holdings are undiver-
siﬁed): expending resources to reduce risk
may beneﬁt the large shareholders at the
expense of the rest of the shareholders.
Management may have a similar conﬂict,
since risk threatens their jobs and they
may have a signiﬁcant proportion of their
wealth tied up in the ﬁrm’s shares. Since
most shareholders in a publicly traded ﬁrm
would not care about the additional risk
attributable to copper price exposure, this
is not a good reason for hedging. (On the
other side of the equation, the cost of
hedging may be very small; we will
consider this consideration further in a
later section on cost issues.) 
A more subtle argument for managing
copper price risk is that failure to do so may
cause ancillary damage within the ﬁrm. As
an extreme case, adverse copper price move-
ments may push the ﬁrm into bankruptcy,
which has a number of deadweight costs to
the ﬁrm, such as payments to lawyers and
accountants and the loss of proﬁtable future
projects. More normally, unhedged risk
exposure may tend to increase taxes, on
average: While the government receives
additional tax payments when the copper
price move is favorable, an unfavorable
move will not create a compensating tax
reduction, given that tax offsets may only be
deferred (and may even be lost). A related
tax reason for managing copper prices is
that the reduction of risk makes it possible
to maintain more leverage to reduce corpo-
rate taxes and avoid “double taxation.”
“Double taxation” is the payment of both
corporate and personal taxes on cash ﬂows
going to equity, compared with payment of
only personal taxes on cash ﬂows going to
debt, since interest expense is an offset to
income in the computation of corporate
income tax. While there are no personal
taxes for institutional investors—and there-
fore no double taxation—the parallel
argument—single taxation versus no
taxation—is valid and even more powerful
for institutions. For individuals there is at
least a possibility that the corporate tax on
equity will be offset by lower taxes at the
individual level through deferred realization
of gains or by a lower capital gains rate. For
tax-exempt or tax-deferred investors, the
extra tax is unmitigated. 
A third argument for managing copper
price risk is that many ﬁrms have a policy
of smoothing earnings, and hedging can
reduce volatility in earnings. Although this
is common practice, it is hard to endorse,
since it seems to be an expenditure of the
owner’s resources to minimize the amount
of information getting out to the owners.
(In principle, smoothing earnings might be
used to eliminate temporary variations and
provide a clearer picture of long-term value,
but it seems more typical that smoothing is
intended to avoid bad-looking quarters
without necessarily distinguishing short-
and long-term shocks.) This use of
hedging may make management more
comfortable and minimize criticism, but
this is not obviously in the interest of
shareholders. In some cases, hedging
could be justiﬁed by the argument that it
avoids restrictive debt covenants, but such
covenants are far from binding in all but a
small proportion of ﬁrms that smooth
earnings. More common is the opposite
extreme case, in which the internal objec-
tive of the ﬁrm is to ensure that earnings
do not fall. Hedging for this purpose may
make management comfortable—indeed
too comfortable—but it discourages prof-
itable innovation. A related strategy for
keeping volatility of earnings small is to
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which implies a large voluntary tax contri-
bution that is not in the interest of
shareholders. 
A fourth argument for managing
copper price risk is to make it easier to 
give managers incentives to produce
proﬁts: By hedging risk, we can make 
(for example) a division manager’s
compensation depend closely on value-
added that the manager can inﬂuence
rather than what the manager can’t
inﬂuence (the actual realization of copper
prices). This argument for managing
copper price risk implies that it may be
optimal to manage copper price risk at the
division level even if copper prices do not
represent a signiﬁcant contribution to the
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. Of course, this strategy
begs the question of why it can’t be done
more cheaply (for compensation purposes
only) using a paper portfolio. 
What Risks Should We Hedge? 
The question of what risks to hedge
must be subordinate to the question of why
we should hedge. If there is not a
compelling reason to hedge a particular
source of risk, then we probably should not
be hedging it. One important issue is the
sense in which we would hedge a certain
type of risk. For example, suppose we are
hedging a bank’s exposure to interest-rate
risk. Should we hedge the direct interest
mismatch of existing assets and liabilities, or
should we hedge the full economic value,
which would include the value of future
business? For example, a bank may ﬁnd
that, as interest rates rise, core deposits tend
to be lost. Current accounting methods
make it hard to hedge this sort of risk
without penalty (and the risk-based capital
requirements from the Basle Accord penalize
almost all hedging because one has to
increase capital once for the underlying cash
ﬂow and once again for the hedge). There is
a related question of whether to hedge cash
ﬂows or value. In principle, the two are the
same (if we were to hedge cash ﬂows far
enough out), but, in practice, hedging cash
ﬂows out a year is much different from
hedging the ﬁrm’s entire value. If the purpose
of hedging is to eliminate sources of noise
that are beyond the manager’s control, it
may even be appropriate to hedge particular
accounting numbers used in computing
compensation rather than hedging cash ﬂow
or economic value. 
With What Instruments 
Should We Hedge? 
For most commonly hedged risks
(such as exposure to interest rates, foreign
exchange rates, or commodity prices),
many instruments can be used for hedging.
For example, to hedge U.S. interest rates
we can use bonds, repurchase agreements,
Treasury bond futures, swaps, caps, or col-
lars. The choice among this set would be
determined by pricing and transaction
costs, match to hedging needs, and
accounting implications. 
Support Your Investment Banker 
A common approach of managers
planning to hedge is to turn the whole
problem over to an investment banker
who, after all, has the expertise and the
traders who can put the hedge in place and
is happy to provide “free” advice on what
to do. As in all markets, the “free” advice
is priced out in what you pay for the
hedge, and then some. To avoid paying too
much, it is best to understand how the
hedge works and how much it should cost.
Ideally, such expertise should be located
in-shop; otherwise, it is worth the expense
of hiring an expert to monitor the prices
being paid to the investment banker. In
general, competition among investment
bankers may be useful in reducing the
cost, but competition will not necessarily
produce any incentive to report when
hedging is unnecessary. 
ACCOUNTANT: 
FRIEND OR FOE?
Suppose we put in place the optimal
hedge computed above, using the model
for demand and option-pricing theory to
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offset the risk in the cash ﬂows. What will
this do to our accounting statements? 
In general, accounting looks at the 
present and the past: Accountants favor
methods whose results are easily replicable,
especially since standard mechanical rules,
even if inaccurate, are easy to defend if 
the ﬁrm has followed Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Hedge
accounting is a relatively new and technical
area, and the accounting profession is 
only starting to address the important 
issues involved.
First of all, the hedge in question does
not seem to meet the requirements for a
hedge as stated in the GAAP . According to
FAS 80, a futures contract must be marked
to market at the end of the accounting
period unless it qualiﬁes as a hedge. To
qualify as a hedge, (1) the futures must be
designated by the ﬁrm as a hedge, (2) there
must be underlying risk to hedge, (3) while
the assessment of risk can be done on a
centralized basis (if it is impractical to do
otherwise), the risk management must be
assessed on a decentralized basis for
speciﬁc assets, liabilities, and ﬁrm commit-
ments, and (4) there must be a clear
economic relationship between the price of
an underlying asset, liability, or ﬁrm com-
mitment, and a high degree of price
“correlation” must be probable. (The refer-
ence to correlation bears no relation to the
usual statistical deﬁnition of correlation:
FAS 80 makes it clear that the statistical
deﬁnition is not intended and may not 
be relevant in assessing compliance. Unfor-
tunately, FAS 80 does not make clear how
correlation should be deﬁned.) Under
these rules, our hedge of sales certainly
does not qualify, since future sales
corresponding to use of copper in produc-
tion are off balance sheet and are not ﬁrm
commitments. Even if the sales were on
the balance sheet, it is not clear whether
they would meet the vague and mysterious
requirement that correlation be probable. 
Failure to qualify as a hedge often
penalizes hedging. An unqualiﬁed hedge
will typically reduce volatility of future cash
ﬂows but increase volatility of reported
earnings. This volatility is especially
damaging when it causes violation of debt
covenants or capital requirements imposed
by regulators. Volatility of earnings may
also subject management to criticism; given
the current hysteria over derivatives, we
may want to pardon a manager who forgoes
an economically useful hedge to avoid the
appearance of “risky exposure to
derivatives.” Part of the problem is that
there seems to be no simple test, given the
current state of hedge accounting, that the
lay public can apply to distinguish risky
speculation from good hedging. 
One interesting feature of the
accounting rules is that hedges that are
economically equivalent may have very
different accounting treatments. Suppose
in the example above that demand does
not depend on copper prices (putting the
same number in all of the “Units Sold”
column in Table 1A) and that we are
simply interested in hedging the input cost
at expected demand. Then it might seem
equivalent to hedge through a long-term
contract with a supplier, by buying copper
futures, or by buying shares in a company
whose share price tracks copper closely.
However, the contract with a supplier has
no impact on earnings before the actual
sale, buying copper futures is covered by
FAS 80 as discussed above, and shares in
the copper company are accounted at fair
value, but unrealized gains and losses are
unlikely to appear in earnings (FAS 115).
In each of these cases, there are various
rules, ranging from somewhat speciﬁc
(FAS 105 and 107) to incredibly vague
(FAS 119), that require a company to report
its risk exposure. FAS 119 is especially
vague; basically, it calls on companies and
accounting ﬁrms to come up with reports
that can be used as a basis for later
standards. This approach comes from a
general recognition that current reporting
practice is often misleading, and from a
paucity of good ideas on how to patch
things up. It seems that hedging tends 
to magnify the problems inherent in 
the accounting profession’s tension
between historical cost and mark-to-
market cost. 
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people have proposed universal adoption
of mark-to-market (or intrinsic value)
accounting, which is “obviously” the cor-
rect thing to do because that is a good
estimate of what the ﬁrm is actually worth,
and any hedge would be seen for what it
is. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what
this means. For example, do we include
future sales in our valuation, and if so,
how far in the future do we go, and how
do we forecast and value the future ﬂows?
Anyone who has been involved in capital
budgeting knows that estimates of future
cash ﬂows are often inaccurate and may
reﬂect the forecaster’s optimism more than
the prospects for the ﬁrm. Even without
these conceptual problems, introducing a
whole new system of accounting is not a
trivial matter. While we note that current
accounting standards are deﬁcient for 
measuring risk, we do not claim that it is
easy to do better. 
The differences in accounting
treatments of economically equivalent
hedges may allow ﬁrms to hedge in spite
of the deﬁciencies in the accounting 
standards. Whether or not a ﬁrm that 
is hedging properly can avoid looking 
bad, it is clear that a ﬁrm that is not
hedging at all, or even increasing risk, 
can look ﬁne. 
COST ISSUES
What is the cost of hedging? It is
tempting to think that the cost of the
hedge is the cost of any securities
purchased in the hedge program. In fact,
the hedge is often bundled with an invest-
ment. It is a fair investment to buy a call
option for its intrinsic value, and absent
market imperfections there is no cost in
doing so. In practice, the cost includes
transaction costs such as commissions,
bid-ask spread, and any internal costs of
trading (e.g., hiring a trader and setting up
accounting oversight). For publicly traded
contracts in liquid markets, the costs are
probably small and easy to measure. When
hedging uses custom contracts provided
by investment bankers, the costs are hard
to assess (because they are built into
pricing) and may be much larger. On a
more esoteric point, we may also want to
include in the cost of hedging the alterna-
tive use of any capital tied up in the
investment or in margin or variation
accounts. On another subtle point, a 
hedge may be more costly than it appears
if its pricing and tax treatment make it
inappropriate for the ﬁrm. 
What is the marginal cost that should
be used as an input for decisions about
pricing the output? It is probably common
to use the hedged price, but in fact the
marginal cost of the commodity at the time
of use is the spot market price (assuming
an active market that was probably neces-
sary to implement the hedge in the ﬁrst
place). It is irrelevant that the price has
been locked in for a ﬁxed quantity, since
that is sunk, and the proﬁt will be
collected or the loss borne on the hedged
quantity however much or little is actually
used. If more is needed, the shortfall will
be purchased at the spot price. If less is
needed, the excess will be sold at the spot
price. In either case, the marginal cost is
the spot price. If the marginal cost is taken
to be the hedge price (or some average
price), value may be discarded. For
example, suppose the spot price is higher
than the hedge price. Then a computation
assuming that marginal cost equals average
price or the hedged price would understate
the true cost of buying more of the input,
and additional units could be sold when it
is more proﬁtable to sell what can be pro-
duced from the hedged quantity of inputs. 
What is the transfer price that should
be used when the commodity is procured
by one unit in the ﬁrm and used by
another? For accounting purposes, the
organization should decide up front how
proﬁts and losses in the hedging program
will be shared. It is probably best to plan
to do so in a way that hedges cash ﬂows in
each unit, since that will tie compensation
in each unit more directly to performance
within the manager’s inﬂuence. If sharing
of hedge proﬁt and loss is not decided in
advance, an inherent unfairness may
result. For example, suppose the transfer
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transfer price is the market price when the
market price is low but a hedged price
when the market is high, the purchasing
unit gets a “free option,” and the procuring
unit loses—whether or not it is hedged.
The free option allows the unit to buy at
the hedged price or the market price,
whichever is less. The procuring unit
always loses money. 
RISK-MANAGEMENT
POLICY
Given that standard accounting proce-
dures do not provide a particularly useful
picture of the quality of a ﬁrm’s hedging
program, it is especially important for
management to adopt and implement an
understandable and effective risk-manage-
ment policy. Such a policy should specify
the goal and scope of any hedging activity,
and it should dictate the degree of central-
ization and the control systems. Further-
more, the policy should provide for over-
sight and evaluation of the effectiveness 
of hedging. 
A common feature of the large
publicized trading losses is a failure of
control systems. Financial ﬁrms face a 
particular temptation to have inadequate
controls. Because ﬁrms want to keep 
successful traders around, they may tend
to be sympathetic to traders’ insistence
that the bureaucracy should not interfere
with their work. A failure to separate the
operations and accounting functions from
trading was an essential common thread 
in the recent losses of over a billion 
dollars each at Barings, Daiwa Bank, 
and Sumitumo. In each case, the loss 
was attributable to a single trader. It is
important to devote serious talent to 
the job of monitoring traders, even though
the monitoring job is less glamorous,
somewhat unpleasant, and, when things
are going well, seemingly unproductive. 
Besides the scenario of speculation
under the guise of risk management, risk
management can be counterproductive 
if it is too localized. To illustrate, the
example we discussed earlier showed 
how a procurement department that is
hedging material costs may actually 
make overall cash ﬂows more variable if
input prices tend to be high when the
industry does well. Less damaging, but
probably still wasteful, is the practice in
which companies use different parts of 
the ﬁrm to offset hedging or they hedge
economically irrelevant risks (such as risks
that represent an insigniﬁcant part of a
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow volatility). For most ﬁrms,
the beneﬁts of centralization (better control,
economies of scale, and cost saving due to
internal netting) will outweigh the costs
(mostly the difﬁculty of communicating
and aggregating needs). Of course, it is a
good idea to have a formal policy in either
case, whether risk management is central-
ized or dispersed. 
A good risk management policy
should state the goals of the hedging pro-
gram. Is it the ﬁrm’s policy to hedge the
value of the ﬁrm or, alternatively, earnings
or dividends paid to shareholders, and if
so, what risks should be hedged and what
risks should be borne by the shareholders?
Should hedging be implemented on a divi-
sional or departmental level (to improve
planning and incentive compensation)
when that hedging does not reduce the
overall variability of the ﬁrm’s value?
Should the hedging program focus on 
cash ﬂows, earnings, tax avoidance, or
something else? We do not yet have 
deﬁnitive answers to these questions, 
but at least a consistent policy will
minimize offsetting efforts. 
One important (but probably often
neglected) aspect of a risk-management
program is the need for ex post evaluation.
Especially because these programs are rela-
tively new, it is entirely possible to design a
program that is ineffective or that even
increases risk (like the naive hedging
strategy in our copper price hedging
example). Only retrospective analysis of
the results can verify that the program is
actually reducing risk. The retrospective
analysis should also look at any side effects
of the hedging, for example variation or
margin account payments required to
maintain the hedge. 
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Risk management is an important and
difﬁcult area of corporate policy. We have seen
news accounts of disastrous failures in risk
management. Less spectacular, but perhaps
more important, is the widespread use of
futures contracts and swaps to hedge foreign
exchange, interest rate, and commodity risks,
since, without this ability to hedge, many
proﬁtable businesses would be too risky. 
The next few years should be especially
interesting, as companies work on imple-
menting vague new accounting standards
that require them to describe their risk
exposure. Now is also an exciting  time for
the development of internal controls and
policies as companies work on devel-
oping effective hedges while avoiding 
catastrophic losses.
SOME FURTHER READINGS
For general information on risk man-
agement, some banks have issued guides
that may be useful. For example, the J. P .
Morgan/Arthur Anderson Guide to Corporate
Risk Management is a primer on risk man-
agement, while The Chase Guide to Risk
Management is an extended glossary
published by Chase Manhattan in associa-
tion with Risk magazine. Another good
general resource is “A Survey of Corporate
Risk Management,” which was a separately
numbered insert to The Economist,
February 10, 1996, pp. 1-22. 
Some observers have debated the
advisability of hedging with options. One
criticism is that hedging with derivatives
often amounts to gambling with ﬁrm
money at the encouragement of banks
(“Betting Your Hedges,” J. Ralfe, Risk, July
1994, pp. 22-23). One good point is that
customized option positions are unlikely
to be a good value, especially if it might be
necessary to unwind the position before
maturity (“Caveat Emptor,” D. Westby,
Risk, June 1995, pp. 24-25). A different
argument is that poorly constructed strate-
gies with poor disclosure can lead to legal
troubles for managers and directors
(“Courting Trouble,” W. Falloon, Risk,
August 1994, pp. 32-33). On the other
side of the debate is the suggestion that
hedging with options is a good idea and
that most criticisms are unjustiﬁed (“Keep
Those Options Open,” M. Schewitz, Risk,
October 1995, pp. 35-36). 
There are, of course, many articles in
the popular press citing speciﬁc hedging
programs gone bad. The case of Metallge-
sellschaft has sparked a debate among
academics, since it may be a case of miscal-
culation of the hedge. In particular, for
commodities subject to temporary shortages,
there is no reason to believe that price
uncertainty over longer horizons can be
hedged effectively by available traded
options at short horizons, although this is
often assumed to be the case. Several
scholars have studied this question using
theoretical tools (S. Ross, “Hedging Long
Run Commitments: Exercises in Incomplete
Market Pricing,” 1995 mimeo, Yale Univer-
sity), empirical tools (F . Edwards and M.
Cantor, “The Collapse of Metallgesellschaft:
Unhedgeable Risks, Poor Hedging Strategy,
or Just Bad Luck,” Journal of Applied Corpo-
rate Finance, Spring 1995, pp. 86-105, or
G. Bakshi, C. Cao, and Z. Chen, “Pricing
and Hedging Long-Term Options,” mimeo,
University of Maryland), or both theoretical
and empirical (S. Pirrong, “Metallgesellschaft:
A Prudent Hedger Ruined, or A Wildcatter
on NYMEX,” mimeo, Washington Univer-
sity in Saint Louis). The defense of
Metallgesellschaft’s hedging program is
that it was a textbook hedge that would
have done ﬁne if not interrupted (C. Culp
and M. Miller, “Hedging a Flow of Commodity
Deliveries with Futures: Lesson from Metallge-
sellschaft,” Derivatives Quarterly, Fall 1994). 
Value at risk (“An Overview of Value
at Risk,” D. Dufﬁe and J. Pan, Journal of
Derivatives, Spring 1997, pp. 7-49) is one
methodology that is widely used in practice
to quantify various common sources of
ﬁnancial risk. This methodology has its
critics, both because an objective measure
is difﬁcult to agree upon (“VAR: Seductive 
but Dangerous,” T. Beder, Financial Analysts
Journal, September-October 1995, pp. 12-
24), and because value at risk neglects
idiosyncratic risk and some market 
sources of risk. 
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